



Director of
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
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EGYPT-LIBYA-SUDAN: Preparations for Defense

Cairo is taking firm steps to deter Libyan attacks on Sudan. []

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The forces of Egypt and Sudan remain on alert with leaves canceled. The two countries have exchanged senior military teams to coordinate action under their Joint Defense Agreement of 1976, which has been invoked by Sudanese President Nimeiri. []

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An Egyptian official discussed with Nimeiri the possibility of Egyptian delivery of some air defense equipment and personnel to Sudan, according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. US military officials in Cairo say that Egyptian F-4 fighters are being prepared for possible deployment to Aswan. []

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The US Embassy reports that Nimeiri appeared alert and composed during a meeting on Saturday. Nimeiri stated that Libya had not succeeded in shaking his regime and that he believed the Sudanese were rallying behind him. []

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Comment: Egyptian leaders want to avoid a repetition of the criticism they received from Nimeiri last year for failing to respond more forcefully to a Libyan-backed coup plot at the time. Moreover, the bombing of the Sudanese broadcasting facility on Friday almost certainly has raised Cairo's estimate of the Libyan threat that Nimeiri faces. Nevertheless, without further Libyan provocations, Egyptian assistance will be limited to the dispatch of a few air defense teams.

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IRAN-IRAQ: Baghdad Anticipates Offensive

Fighting continues in the Al Basrah area, and Iraq expects Iran to launch its main offensive soon. [REDACTED]

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Baghdad claims the Iranians suffered heavy casualties on the Al Basrah front over the weekend, and Iran says its forces repulsed an Iraqi attack on the central front. [REDACTED]

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Baghdad announced on Saturday that it expected the main Iranian push by yesterday. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Iraq probably will not be able to take the Majnoon Islands now that the pontoon bridge is in place. Tehran is not likely to finish preparations for the offensive for another week. Both sides, however, will continue limited attacks and counterattacks in advance of Iran's main effort. [REDACTED]

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
GRENADA: New Jewel Movement's Political Plans

The New Jewel Movement apparently is having little success in its attempts to build public support and raise funds. [redacted]

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The celebration last Tuesday of the fifth anniversary of the takeover of the government by the Movement attracted less than 100 people. The US Embassy reports the event had received substantial advance publicity, including the distribution of posters depicting it as a memorial ceremony for the late Prime Minister Bishop. [redacted]

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Lack of funds remains a serious problem. [redacted]


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Comment: New Jewel leaders are disappointed by the poor turnout at events held in Bishop's memory during the past two months, and they probably are reassessing their strategy. If they do participate in the election, they will court young voters and former members of the People's Revolutionary Army—most of whom are unemployed. [redacted]

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AFGHANISTAN: Desertions and Mutinies Increasing

US Embassy sources say the Afghan Government's decision to extend the length of mandatory service for soldiers serving in Kabul from three to four years is causing widespread desertions. Half of the government military posts near the Kabul airport were found to be unoccupied on 9 March. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] about 120 Afghan soldiers from the 8th Division abandoned their positions and destroyed two military posts before joining insurgent forces in the Paghman Valley, west of Kabul. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The regime probably increased the term of service as a result of the failure of its recent conscription campaigns. The change eventually is likely to affect all Afghan troops because most soldiers are assigned to Kabul at some point in their tours. It also will cause an increase in the number of male civilians fleeing Afghanistan. News of the desertions in Kabul may cause more mutinies in other Afghan units, thereby impeding efforts by the Soviets to improve the effectiveness of the Afghan forces. [REDACTED]

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YUGOSLAVIA: Expanding Federal Police Controls

Press reports state the Federal Interior Ministry's efforts to expand its jurisdiction are meeting some opposition in the Federal Assembly. Last September the federal secret police asked for permission to conduct "actions to protect the system" without the approval of local authorities. A Yugoslav official says that the police also wanted emergency powers to act without prior approval of the State Presidency. According to the press, however, many Assembly delegates objected to this arrangement. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Yugoslav leaders, who are under pressure from the military and others to tighten order and discipline, almost certainly will push ahead with the controversial legislation. Although regional officials may fear concessions to the federal security apparatus as a step toward increasing Belgrade's powers, their opposition apparently is weakening. Political opponents of Interior Minister Dolanc may be less inclined to block the legislation, because he will leave this post to become a member of the State Presidency in mid-May. [REDACTED]

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Special Analysis

EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Views on the Soviet Succession

East European leaders presumably are looking forward to their first substantive meetings with the new leadership in Moscow—perhaps as early as next month—to assess any changes in policy and the power relationships among top Soviet officials. Some reportedly believe the elevation of General Secretary Chernenko will bring a return to the less disruptive policies of the Brezhnev era. Nonetheless, relations with the USSR over the next several years are likely to be troubled by uncertainty about the political lineup in Moscow and by Soviet economic strategies that conflict with East European policies. The East Europeans probably will try to establish ties with members of the current collective leadership while putting themselves in position to cope with the next transition in the USSR.

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The East Germans, Czechoslovaks, and Bulgarians demonstrated their satisfaction with the succession by publishing warmer commentaries on Chernenko than they had for Andropov when he became General Secretary. According to the US Embassy in Berlin, East German party chief Honecker has good personal rapport with Chernenko. The conservative Czechoslovak leadership reportedly sees Chernenko as less of a threat to the status quo.

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These leaders probably are more comfortable dealing with Chernenko, because he is a known quantity with whom they have dealt over a number of years. They presumably hope he will not be as vigorous in carrying out of the anticorruption campaign and other policies advocated by Andropov that troubled them. They also will be somewhat relieved that there once again is a General Secretary who can carry out his duties.

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The Romanians, somewhat belatedly, also published warmer congratulations to Chernenko than they had sent to Andropov. This reflects their hope that a weak leadership under Chernenko would give them more room to follow an independent policy.

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Foreign Minister Andrei reportedly told a West European ambassador that the Romanians understand Chernenko and had worked well with him in the past. Under Andropov, the USSR's relations with Romania had deteriorated.

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The most serious concern, however, has come from Poles and Hungarians, whose respective domestic policies diverge the furthest

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from Moscow's. [redacted] Polish
 leaders expect Chernenko to take a harder line toward Poland, partly
 because—as a strong believer in the party organization—he would
 not condone the role of the Polish military. [redacted]

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The Hungarians appear concerned that the new Soviet leadership
 might not be as sympathetic as Andropov was toward their innovative
 policies, and they will try to build new support for them in Moscow.
 The US Embassy in Budapest notes that party chief Kadar appeared
 to go out of his way publicly to emphasize his loyalty to Chernenko.
 The Hungarians, however, apparently have decided to go ahead with
 the scheduled approval later this month of a long-term reform
 package rather than wait to gauge Moscow's reaction. [redacted]

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CEMA Summit

The Yugoslav and Japanese Ambassadors in Sofia have told the
 US Embassy there that the long-awaited CEMA summit is to be held
 in Moscow in April. The early scheduling of the summit implies there
 will be no major changes in the agenda and in the policy statements
 that were agreed on last fall. [redacted]

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The East Europeans will be particularly sensitive to any
 indications that the Soviet leadership will try again to integrate
 economic planning. They also will be attentive to Soviet attitudes,
 following INF, on trade and political ties with the West and on military
 modernization and defense spending. [redacted]

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The Japanese Ambassador also says that a Warsaw Pact summit
 is to occur in Moscow in April or May. [redacted]

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Implications

The transition period in the USSR will create a number of
 uncertainties for the East Europeans that could lead to drift and
 indecision in the coming months. Much will depend on the degree of
 unity among Soviet leaders on issues concerning Eastern Europe and
 on the priority they assign to relations with the region. [redacted]

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The East Europeans who feel most secure at home will continue policies they believe have already received Moscow's approval. At the same time, however, they are sensitive to the possibility that policy initiatives could provoke Soviet criticism. [REDACTED]

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Except for Romanian President Ceausescu, none of the East European leaders are politically daring. Honecker, however, has indicated a willingness to go ahead with the resolution of some problems with West German Chancellor Kohl. The Hungarians also will proceed with economic reform proposals. [REDACTED]

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The tendency to drift will be more pronounced in some countries if the Soviet leadership does not follow through on promises to continue limited efforts at reform in the USSR. Those in Eastern Europe who support reform—and indeed would take it much further than Moscow would contemplate for itself—need the example of Soviet reform efforts to help overcome the opposition of hardliners at home. [REDACTED]

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East European uncertainties will be made worse by the difficulties in working with a Soviet leadership that is still sorting out its own internal power relationships. The Hungarians, for example, reportedly believe that Politburo member Gorbachev is sympathetic to their economic policies. [REDACTED]

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If Jaruzelski comes under pressure from Soviet civilian leaders, he may seek the help of Defense Minister Ustinov. [REDACTED]

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The East Europeans also will be looking ahead to the next transition. They will be concerned that cultivating close relations with the wrong candidate for leadership could have serious consequences. [REDACTED]

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In the longer term, the East European and Soviet economies face difficult problems that could cause increasing friction. If the new Soviet leadership increases economic demands on the East Europeans, the East Europeans will have to defend their own economic interests more strongly or face heightened domestic unrest. No matter how such issues are resolved, the forces pulling the countries of Eastern Europe in different directions are likely to become stronger. [REDACTED]

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